摘要
庄子在《齐物论》中提出"吾丧我"的观点,认为人只有摆脱与"物"相对待的"我",放弃对象性的立场,进入与"道"圆融的忘境,才能回归天地之间,重返本然状态。无独有偶,法国哲学家鲍德里亚也在其后期哲学中一再强调"主体的消失",并试图借由"物的反攻"来破除主体中心主义,以物的逻辑将主体逼到绝境。时空殊异,但庄子与鲍德里亚却都看到了人的困境,即,"主体之我"不断遮蔽"本真之我"的时代状况。对于这个困境,他们的解决之道也颇为相似:一位提出"吾丧我",另一位则提出"主体的消失",都寄希望于处在对象性关系中的"我"的解消。但庄子与鲍德里亚的分歧恰恰产生在对"我"进行解消的方式上,简言之,庄子主张"丧我以道",即通过"忘"或"丧",放下"成心"与"我执",使人回归于道;而鲍德里亚则主张"丧我以物",主张以物的至上性取代主体的霸权。庄子将世界整体视为道的展开,以道统摄万事万物,相形之下,鲍德里亚的学说因欠缺超越性和建构性,常常被指斥为一种荒诞玄学。然而,鲍德里亚对于主体主义逻辑的推演,在同代人中却最为极致;他对于该逻辑的反叛,同样也最为彻底。在他看来,绝境当中唯一的救赎只能是理论的暴力,是知识的恐怖主义,亦即是,那个被他称为"虚无主义"的东西。
In the chapter "The Adjustment of Controversies" in his eponymous work, Zhuangzi has the character Nanguo Ziqi declare "I effaced myself," thereby holding that one can return to the state of naturalness only after breaking with the "self" that is in opposition to "objects," abandoning his subject-object standpoint and entering a state of "effacement" wherein one fuses with the Dao. Coincidently, the French philosopher Jean Baudrillard also repeatedly stresses the "disappearance of the subject" in his later philosophy, trying to dissolve subject-centrism by means of a counterattack by the object wherein its logic would entrap the subject. Although they lived in different times, both Zhuangzi and Bandrillard note the same human predicament- the situation wherein the "I as subject" constantly obscures the "real I." Their resolutions of the predicament are similar: both put their hopes in the dissolution of the "I" or self in subject-object relations, with Zhuangzi declaring "I effaced myself" and Baudrillard mooting the "disappearance of the subject." They differ, however, on how to dissolve the "I" (myself). Briefly, Zhuangzi advocates "effacing myself through the Dao," that is, quitting one's "fixed mindset" and "egoism" and returning to the Dao by means of "forgetting" or "effacing"; Baudrillard, on the other hand, proposes to "efface oneself through the object," i.e., replace the supremacy of the subject with that of the object. Baudrillard's theory has often been criticized as pataphysics because of its nihilism without transcendence; in contrast, Zhuangzi's view, which construes the whole world as the unfolding of the Dao, seems more thought-provoking.
出处
《晋阳学刊》
CSSCI
2015年第6期86-93,共8页
Academic Journal of Jinyang
关键词
吾
我
道
物
虚无主义
I
I (myself)
Dao
object
Nihilism