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国家重点生态功能区转移支付差异化契约研究 被引量:1

Study on the Transfer Payment differentiation Contract of National Key Ecological Function Zone
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摘要 国家重点生态功能区转移支付是通过中央政府和县级政府签订生态补偿契约的形式实施的。中央政府应避免"一刀切"政策,构建以生态效益最大化为目标的生态转移支付差异化契约。文章通过中央政府和县级政府委托代理行为选择的分析,发现在信息不对称条件下,中央政府除支付保留效用和努力成本外,还需要支付风险成本和信息租金。随后,文章对理论分析进行数值模拟,结果表明,收益共享系数和信息租金都随产出方差、风险规避度和成本效率参数递增;风险成本随产出方差和风险规避度递增,随成本效率参数递减。 The transfer payment of national key ecological function zone is implemented by signing the ecological compensation contract between the central government and the county governments. The central government should avoid 'making it rigidly uniform'policy and design a differentiation contract to maximize ecological benefit. This paper analyses the principal-agent behavior choices of the central government and county governments and finds that the central government not only pays reservation utility and effort costs,but also needs to pay risk cost and information rent under the condition of information asymmetry. Later,this paper numerically simulates theoretical analysis. The results indicate that revenue sharing coefficient and information rent increase with the output variance,risk aversion degree and cost efficiency parameter. Risk cost increases with the variance of output and risk aversion degree but diminishes with cost efficiency parameter.
出处 《当代经济科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2015年第6期92-98,125,共7页 Modern Economic Science
基金 国家社科基金重大项目"完善生态补偿机制研究"(12&ZD072)
关键词 信息不对称 国家重点生态功能区 生态补偿 差异化契约 Information Asymmetry National Key Ecological Function Zone Ecological Compensation Differentiation Contract
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