政绩考核与地方政府债务关系研究--基于中部省际面板数据分析

Research on the Relationship between Performance Evaluation and Local Government Debt:An Analysis Based on Panel Data of the Central Provinces

从政绩考核的视角,对地方政府债务扩张的动力机制进行理论分析并作出模型假设,剖析了地方政府债务规模不断扩张的内在机理。在对中部六省地方债务规模估算的基础上,通过构建单方程回归模型,利用中部六省2001-2013年的数据进行实证分析,研究发现:来自于地方政府内部的政绩考核机制产生的激励作用使政府官员具有不断增加投融资的偏好,从而使得地方政府债务处于不断扩张的境地。同时,随着中国经济增长方式转变带来经济下行压力的加大,政绩考核下的政治激励使得地方政府更加偏好"借钱",作为政绩考核的量化指标GDP对地方债务规模具有强烈的扩张效应。

From the perspective of performance evaluation, this paper makes a theoretical analysis of the dynamic mechanism of local government debt expansion and establishes the model assumptions to dissect the internal mechanism of the continuous local government debt expansion. On the basis of the estimation of the debt scale of the six central provinces, this paper establishes a signal-equation regression model to conduct an empirical analysis with the data from 2001 to 2013 in the six central provinces. The results show that the incentives produced from the performance evaluation mechanism within the local government can increase the preferences of government officials to investment and financing, thus the local government debt stays in a situation of constant expanding. Meanwhile, with the increasing pressure of economic downturn brought forward by China＇ s economic growth mode transformation, the political incentives under the performance evaluation make local governments more willing to ＂borrow money＂. As a quantitative indicator of performance evaluation, GDP has brought a strong expansionary effect to the scale of local government debt.