期刊文献+

技术溢出、企业研发路径与政府政策引导 被引量:1

Technology Spillover,Firm's R&D Path and Government's Policy Guidance
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摘要 针对技术溢出程度的不确定,建立了三阶段研发博弈模型,研究了企业最优研发路径的选择问题。在此基础上,分析了企业利润最大化与社会福利最大化的目标一致性以及政府的财税政策在纠正两目标差距上的有效性。结果表明:当技术溢出较小时,企业选择的最优研发路径能使两者目标一致;当技术溢出较大时,企业的最优研发路径会使两者目标不一致,此时政府需要对企业进行引导以促进协同创新,其中差异化补贴政策能有效纠正目标差距,政府减免企业所得税能有效缩小目标差距。 This paper establishes a three-stage game model for RD to study the optimized RD path of enterprise.On this basis,it analyzes the consistency of profit maximization and social welfare maximization,as well as the effectiveness of taxation policy of government on narrowing this gap.The conclusions are as follows:when technology spillover is small,profit maximization and social welfare maximization require the same innovation path in the condition of the optimized RD path chosen by enterprise;when technology spillover is large,government regulation is needed to maximize social welfare;differentiated subsidy policy helps to adjust the gap,and the reduction and exemption of income tax helps to narrow this gap.
出处 《技术经济》 CSSCI 北大核心 2015年第11期47-53,共7页 Journal of Technology Economics
基金 国家自然科学基金项目"技术溢出效应的多维测度与我国创新模式的优化策略"(71273128) 教育部人文社会科学规划基金项目"中国高技术产品贸易顺差的理论解释:基于国际技术溢出与本土创新互动下技术进步视角"(11YJA790159) 教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目"产能结构性过剩与不足矛盾下我国战略性新兴产业补贴方式研究"(15YJC790112) 江苏省高校哲学社会科学研究重点项目"新产业革命和江苏经济结构转型升级研究"(2013ZDIXM007)
关键词 技术溢出 协同创新 研发路径 政策引导 政策有效性 technology spillover collaborative innovation R&D path policy guide policy effectiveness
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参考文献18

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