终极控制权对直接代理人收益的影响研究——基于产权属性和控股结构双维度的对比分析

Research on the Influence of Ultimate Control Right on Direct Agent Income——Comparative Analysis of Double Dimensions Based on Ownership Attribute and Equity Ownership Structure

上市公司控制权与代理权的分离带来了终极控制人与直接代理人之间的利益冲突。基于产权属性和控股结构将上市公司分为国有直接控制、国有金字塔控制、民营直接控制和民营金字塔控制四种类型,利用我国A股上市公司的面板数据,实证检验终极控制权对直接代理人总收益、显性收益、隐性收益的影响,分析表明:在国有直接控制和民营金字塔控制上市公司,终极控制权对直接代理人的各种收益均有显著影响;在国有金字塔控制上市公司,终极控制权对直接代理人的隐性收益有显著影响,但对其显性收益的影响不明显;而在民营直接控制上市公司,终极控制权对直接代理人收益没有显著影响。

The separation of control right from agent right of listed companies brings the interests conflict between ultimate controllers and direct agents. Based on equity contribute and share-control structure,the listed companies are classified into such four types as state-owned direct control,state-owned pyramid control,private direct control and private pyramid control,and the panel data of A-share listed companies are used to empirically test the influence of ultimate control right on the total income,dominant income and implicit income of direct agents. The analysis shows that in the listed companies of state-owned direct control and private pyramid control,the ultimate control rights have obvious impact on all kinds of income of direct agents,that in state-owned pyramid control listed companies,ultimate control rights have significant effect on implicit income of direct agents and have unclear effect on their explicit income,however,in private direct control listed companies,ultimate control rights do not have significant impact on the income of direct agents.