银行竞争、终极控制与债务配置结构

Bank Competition,Ultimate Controlling Shareholder and Placement Structure of Debt

本文研究了影响上市公司债务配置决策的内外动因。研究发现,终极控制人对强势债权人监管的规避动机会直接影响上市公司债务融资决策,具体表现为:终极控制人两权分离度越大,银行借贷比例越低、公开债务比例越高。进一步地,银行竞争作为影响银行债权治理效力的外部因素,其业内竞争加剧会弱化单个银行债权人原本强势的监管效力,终极控制人规避动机减弱,并由此提升其银行借贷比例。本文研究支持了"终极控制人规避强势债权人监管"的立论,为公开市场投资者与政府监管部门防范终极控制人道德风险、完善债券市场建设以及加强银行业风险防范提供了经验证据。

This paper studies the internal and external motivation that influence the placement of debt of listed companies in China. We find before the ultimate controlling shareholder made the debt financing decision,he prefers to avoid the supervision from a stronger creditor,and this internal motivation directly affects the listed companies' debt approach. The greater the separation of control- right and voting- right,the lower the proportion of bank lending,and the higher the public debt ratios. Further,as the external factor influencing the bank creditor's rights governance effect,the bank competition weakens a single bank creditor's regulatory effect,so the evade motivation of ultimate controlling shareholder is abate,and then the bank lending rate is raised. Our conclusions support the basic theory that the ultimate controlling shareholder prefers to avoid strong creditor's supervision,and provides empirical evidence to prevent the ultimate controlling shareholder's moral risk for the public market investors and regulators,to perfect the construction of the bond market,and strengthen the banking risk prevention.