机构投资者、税收征管与企业避税

Institutional Investor,Tax Enforcement and Tax Avoidance

本文研究机构投资者对企业避税的因果关系影响。有鉴于机构投资者和企业避税之间的内生性问题,本文选择机构投资者与被投资上市公司之间的空间距离作为机构持股的工具变量,我们发现在控制内生性之后,机构投资者对企业避税行为仍然存在明显的制约作用;进一步研究发现机构投资者与税收征管在避税上存在互为补充的关系,同时机构投资者能通过抑制企业避税提升公司价值,而这一效应在税收征管强的地区更为明显。本文提供了机构投资者对企业避税影响的因果关系证据,从而拓展了机构投资者公司治理作用的文献,对于抑制管理层的机会主义倾向和治理企业避税也有重要的实践意义。

This paper investigates the causal relationship between institutional investors and corporate tax avoidance. Institutional ownership and corporate tax avoidance has strongly endogenous relationship,therefore we choose the space distance between institutional investors and listed companies as instrumental variables. We find that institutional investors can restrain tax avoidance even after controlling the problem of endogeneity. Our research shows that institutional investors and tax enforcement on corporate tax avoidance is complementary relationship. At the same time,institutional investors can significantly ease the negative relationship between tax avoidance and corporate value,and this effect is more obvious in high intensity area of tax enforcement. Our paper provides causality evidence of institutional investors on tax avoidance,and extends the literature of institutional investors and tax enforcement,and also has important practical significance to the governance of tax avoidance and the inhibition of management opportunism.