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经营者集中反垄断控制中的资产分持规则研究 被引量:6

A Study on the Hold-Separate Rules in Merger Control
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摘要 资产分持规则是经营者集中反垄断控制制度中的一项具体规则,形成于美欧反垄断机构的执法实践,其目的主要是防止附加资产剥离义务的当事人在资产剥离过渡期内,贬损拟剥离资产的价值和竞争力及相关市场的竞争。我国《反垄断法》实施后,执法机构通过部门规章规定了资产分持条款,公布的附条件批准案件采用了分持救济措施,但理论界尚未对此进行深入的研究。在此背景下,本文考察了美欧创设资产分持规则的目的和规则的性质,梳理了资产分持规则的适用条件、内容和实施监管的方法,揭示了资产分持规则的完整体系,并对我国进一步完善资产分持规则立法和执法实践提出了意见和建议。 Hold-separate, a specific set of rules in merger control are derived from the practice of antitrust enforcement agencies in the U.S. and Europe, aiming to prevent parties with divestiture obligations from reducing the value and competitiveness of assets to be divested during divesture transition period, or damaging the competition in relevant market. Since China' s Anti-Monopoly law came into force, anti-monopoly agencies have adopted hold-separate articles in agency rules and used hold-separate remedy measures in conditional approval decisions. However, studies on these rules among academic scholars are still rather limited. Under these circumstances, this article looks into the purpose and nature of hold-separate rules in the U.S. and Europe, summaries the rules' conditions of application, contents and ways to monitor their application. The article aims to analyze the hold-separate rules systematically and offer comments and advices on hold-separate rules to legislative and enforcement authorities in China.
作者 叶军
机构地区 商务部反垄断局
出处 《比较法研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2015年第6期158-173,共16页 Journal of Comparative Law
关键词 反垄断 经营者集中 资产分持 anti-monopoly concentration between undertakings hold-separate
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参考文献57

  • 1案件公告见商务部反垄断局官方网站:http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn.
  • 2Frequently Asked Questions about Merger Consent Order Provisions, available at http://www, ftc. gov/bc/mergerfaq, shtm#Hold Separate Orders.
  • 3Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 and under Commission Regulation (EC) No 802/2004(2008/) , para. 108.
  • 4ICN Merger Working Group: Analytical Framework Subgroup, Merger Remedies Review Project, Report for the Fourth ICN Annual Conference, Bonn-June 2005, para. 3.16.
  • 5Negotiating Merger Remedies Statement of the Bureau of Competition of the Federal Trade Commission, Richard Feinstein Director (January 2012).
  • 6U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division: Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies (June 2011 ).
  • 7Frequently Asked Questions about Merger Consent Order Provisions, available at http://www, ftc. gov/bc/mergerfaq, shtm#Hold Separateoee.
  • 8"Merger Remedies Study ( Public Version) ", DG COMP, European Commission, October 2005, Page 59, para. 12.
  • 9A Study of the Commission' s Divestitures Process ( Public Version), Prepared by the Staff of the Bureau of Competition of the Federal Trade Commission, William J. Baer Director, 1999.
  • 10U.S. Depment of Justice Antitrust Division: Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies (June 2011 ). IV. Implementing Effective Remedies: Practical Considerations, B. Protecting Divestiture Remedies, 1. Hold Separate Provisions.

同被引文献123

  • 1臧旭恒.从哈佛学派、芝加哥学派到后芝加哥学派——反托拉斯与竞争政策的产业经济学理论基础的发展与展望[J].东岳论丛,2007,28(1):15-20. 被引量:26
  • 2商务部反垄断局网站:http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/b/c/201412/20141200835207.shtml.
  • 3商务部公告2010年第41号《关于实施经营者集中资产或业务剥离的暂行规定》,参见商务部反垄断局网站:http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/c/201007/201.0707012.00.shtml.
  • 4商务部反垄断局网站:http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/ztxx/2.0904/20090406198805.html.
  • 5商务部反垄断局官方网站:http://fldj.roofcorn.gov.cn/article/ztxx/201304/20130400091222.shtml.
  • 6《关于救济措施的通告(2001年)》.
  • 7European Commission, Merger Remedies Study (Public version), DG COMP, October 2005, p.52.
  • 8Merger Remedies: Competition Commission Guidelines, (2008), para. 3.13 and 3.14.
  • 9Barbara A. Clark, "Merger investigations at the Federal Trade Commission: An Insider's view", 56 Antitrust Law Journal, 776--777(1987).
  • 10Carl Shapiro and Michael Sohn, "'Crown Jewel' Provisions in Merger Consent Decrees", Fall, Antitrust, 27(1997).

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