企业自主创新的博弈分析

Game Analysis of Enterprises'Independent Innovation

自主创新能够驱动产业结构升级,推动一国经济发展,其重要性毋庸置疑。对企业间自主创新的行为策略进行了博弈分析,结合我国国情建立了政府补贴的自主创新博弈模型。研究表明,如果政府在企业创新时给予一次性直接补贴或者阶梯式补贴,后发优势的等待博弈将转化为抢先进入博弈,企业具有抢先创新的动机。因此,政府可以通过税收、补贴等不同的政策组合激励企业积极创新。

There is no doubt that independent innovation can drive the upgrading of the industrial structure and promote the economic development of a country.Heidrun C.Hoppe and Ulrich Lehmann-Grubes model was introduced and the independent innovation behavior strategy of enterprises was analyzed in this paper.On the basis of the above,the model was improved and the independent innovation game model with government subsidy was established.Research shows that the dynamic nature switches from a waiting game with a second-mover advantage to a preemption game as the government give one-off government subsidy or multi-step government subsidy,and the enterprise has a preemptive innovation motivation.Therefore,the government should provide targeted incentives through different policies,such as taxation,grant and so on,to promote firms to innovate positively.