论事实与价值的联系

On the Relationship Between Fact and Value

摩尔的未决问题论证表明任何为善概念下定义的努力都将成为自然主义谬误。自然主义谬误的根源在于,事实性的自然经验术语或经验性事物与道德价值术语两者之间是不能等同的。摩尔之后,任何把事实与价值联系起来的努力,都必然要回答摩尔的问题。早期美国实用主义者詹姆士、杜威等人的自然主义努力没有成功地回答摩尔的问题,上世纪五六十年代福特等人从德性品格等人性事实来反驳摩尔的自然主义谬误,人性这种在摩尔看来的"自然"因素,不可避免地与价值评价内在相关,而不是分离的,从而使摩尔的未决问题论证失灵。当代以塞尔等人为代表的自然主义的论证表明,从制度惯例事实的事实判断到规范性的价值判断并非不可能,而是合乎逻辑的,因为制度惯例事实本身包含着价值因素。那么,从制度性事实之"是"到规范性的"应当"的内在联系看,摩尔的未决问题论证再一次失灵了。但是,我们也应看到,摩尔的未决问题论证揭示的事实与价值的区分仍然有着积极意义,事实与价值这对概念的区分是建立两者联系的前提,摩尔只是未能正确建立起两者的联系,福特、塞尔等人的努力揭示了事实与价值之间的联系,打破了摩尔的僵硬二分。

The Open Question Argument of G. C. More＇s shows that any effort to define the concept of good will become the naturalist falsehood. The substance of naturalism lies in that natural and experiential facts and the terms of moral value can＇t link each other. After G. C. More,the effort of linking facts and value have to answer the question of G. C More. In the early period,the effort of naturalism had not successfully answered the question. Philippa Foot took the facts of human nature,for example,virtue or character in human being,to point out that they were inevitably linked with evaluation internally and could not be separated with each other. The naturalist argument by John Searle shows that it is not impossible to develop from the institutional and conventional facts to the normal and value judgment and it is indeed logically possible. Therefore,the Argument of G. C More lost its meaning when it faced with the facts of institutional and conventional facts. However,the problematic argument of More has significant enlightenment on the distinction of fact and value： the relation of the two could be formed only when they are separated in conception.