中日关系的政治经济学——非均衡发展、理性冲突与“底层结构”的构筑

The Political Economics of Sino-Japanese Relations:Unbalanced Development,Rational Conflict and the Building of "Bottom Infrastructure"

中日关系的一个典型化事实是政治关系与经济关系的非均衡发展,这是由中日政治关系与经济关系各自行为主体的行动选择差异决定的,表现为一种政治家理性与企业家理性的冲突。政治家追求政治租金最大化,往往屈从民意,为民族主义所绑架,其行动选择使中日政治关系趋冷;企业家追求利润最大化,往往冲破政治束缚,跨越国境进行贸易投资,其行动选择使中日经济关系趋热。其结果是,形成了中日之间政治关系与经济关系的非均衡发展。目前中日关系的僵局尚未得到有效化解,中日关系中政治与经济的高水平均衡不可企望,而低水平均衡又应该尽量避免,非均衡状态就成为一种次优选择。在这一约束条件下,构筑中日关系的"底层结构",即企业和个人层面上的中日关系的微观运行机制,是使中日关系回归到相对正常状态的一条现实路径。

A typical instance of Sino - Japanese relations is the unbalanced development of political and economic relations, which is caused by the action of different behavior subjects concerning Sino - Japanese political relations and economic relations, reflected by the rational conflict between politicians and entrepreneurs. Politicians, seeking to maximize political interest, often follow the public opinion or even are kidnapped by nationalism, resulting in the cooling of Sino - Japanese political relations. Entrepreneurs, meanwhile, seeking to maximize economic profits, attempt to break political shackles and improve bilateral trading, resulting in the warming- up of Sino- Japanese economic relations. Currently, the deadlock of Sino-Japanese relations has not been effectively resolved. A high level of political and economic balance in Sino- Japanese relations can be not achieved, and a low level balance should be avoided. Therefore, an non - equilibrium situation becomes a second- best choice. In the context, building a “bottom infrastructure”, a micro- operational mechanism at the level of enterprises and individuals, for the Sino-Japanese relations, is the realistic path of making Sino - Japanese relations return to normal.