抗战初期中共军事发展方针变动的史实考析--兼谈所谓“七分发展，二分应付，一分抗日”方针的真实性问题

Historical Examination and Analysis of the Changes to the Communist Party of China's Policy of Military Development in the Early Period of the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression—With a Discussion of the Policy of "70 Percent for Development,20

1937年"七七事变"爆发前,蒋介石及其南京中央政府拥有近200万军队,国民党已基本上统一中国。中共这时只剩下2万党员、3万左右红军和陕甘交界处十几个县的活动范围。在此背景下,双方已就中共苏维埃政府和红军改制改编问题达成初步妥协,唯具体办法尚未落实,十年内战造成的隔阂与敌对的情绪也并未消失。"七七事变"爆发,战火迅速蔓延,日军很快打进山西,直接威胁到中共中央所在的陕北。红军加速改编并出兵山西,与国民党军配合作战,已不可避免。但是,中共及毛泽东均首次碰到如此复杂且多变的政治军事情势,既要在开战前先解决好军队、政权、防地和党的合法性问题,又要千方百计阻止日军占领山西;既要在军事上表现出相当气势,给华北各军鼓气,又要避免两三万红军在完全不熟悉的条件和不擅长的方式下对日作战,包括出动后被调散,造成毁灭性的损失。因此,围绕着出兵速度、作战及指挥方式等问题,中共中央内部一度出现了意见分歧。不过,即使当年9月下旬红军主力全部出动后,毛泽东等主要关注的军事作战及其发展区域,仍限于山西。所谓向敌后发展,以及去平原地区创建根据地等,都是在日军占领了大半个山西以后,才逐渐开始提上毛泽东和中央军委的议事日程的。

Before the outbreak of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in 1937,Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist government in Nanjing had nearly 2 million troops,and the Kuomintang(KMT) had basically unified China.At the same time,the Communist Party of China(CPC) only had around 20,000 party members and 30,000 Red Army soldiers,and only controlled around a dozen counties in the border region between Shaanxi and Gansu provinces.Against this background,the two Parties had reached a preliminary agreement on the reform and reorganization of the CPC's Soviet-style government and the Red Army.However,they had not implemented a specific approach,and the strain and hostility developed during ten years of civil war had not disappeared.After the eruption of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident,the flames of war swiftly spread,and the Japanese army rapidly invaded Shanxi province,directly threatening the security of the CPC's base in North Shaanxi province.The Red Army accelerated its reorganization and sent troops to Shanxi province,where it was forced to cooperate with the KMT army in order to defend against the Japanese.However,this was the first time the CPC and Mao Zedong had faced such a complicated,fast-changing political and military situation.They therefore endured devastating losses.This is because,before entering battle,they needed to resolve questions about the legitimacy of the Party,its military capability,its political power,and its defense,but they also needed to make every attempt to prevent the Japanese from occupying Shanxi province.They also suffered losses because they wanted to display their strength to inspire the other armies in North China,but they needed to avoid fighting the Japanese in a situation in which 20,000 to 30,000 Red Army troops were completely unfamiliar with both the situation and necessary military tactics such as dispersal.Because of these problems,the Central Committee of the CPC split over issues like deployment speeds,combat,and command leadership.However,even after the core of the Red Army went to the battlefield in late September of 1937,the area of military operations and development with which Mao Zedong and the other leaders were primarily concerned was limited to Shanxi province.Only after the Japanese occupied most of Shanxi did the policies of developing in the rear areas and building a base of operations in the plains gradually arise in discussions of the agenda among Mao Zedong and the Central Military Committee of the CPC.