金融发展、政府干预与资本配置效率——基于中国1978-2013年的经验分析

Financial Development,Government Intervention and Capital Allocation Efficiency:Empirical Test from 1978-2013

该文从制度变迁的视角,厘清了金融发展和政府干预影响资本配置效率的内在机制,并进行了实证检验。首先,根据中国1978-2013年的省际数据,采用Wurgler(2000)模型测算了中国整体的资本配置效率。结果发现,以1994年分税制改革为界,中国资本配置效率呈现先升高后下降的结构性特点,且波动较大。其次,该文还构建了非国有企业信贷额占GDP比重等金融发展指标对上述结论进行实证分析。研究表明,在1994年以前,中国政府干预金融的力度较弱,主要通过财政支出对市场化的资本配置造成挤出,金融发展对资本配置效率具有显著的正向影响;而在1994年以后,中国政府干预金融的力度加强,金融发展对资本配置效率呈现弱的正向影响,其中,地方政府对金融体系的干预是导致资本配置效率下降的重要原因。因此,建立合理的财政体制和官员考察晋升制度是发挥金融体系对资本配置的效率并提高其正面效用的重要制度保障。

With the perspective of institutional change, this paper clarifies the internal mechanisms that how financial development and government intervention influence the capital allocation efficiency, then, we carries on the empirical test. Firstly, we measure the capital allocation efficiency of China with provincial-level data from1978 to 2013 by Wurgler （2000） model. Results show that China＇s capital allocation efficiency fluctuated and has structural transformation during the last thirty years, it rose gradually from 1978 to 1993 and fell samlly after the tax reform in 1994. Secondly, we builds new financial development indicator that the non-state enterprise credit/GDP. The empirical analysis shows that before 1994, financial development has significant positive influence on the capital allocation efficiency, government intervention extruded the marketization of capital allocation with fiscal expenditure; after 1994, the local government intervention on financial system is one of the important factors that led to the decrease of the capital allocation efficiency, financial development has less effect on the improvement of the capital allocation efficiency. Finally, we suggest that promoting the fiscal system and political system reform is a better play to enhance the effect of financial system to improve the capital allocation efficiency.