摘要
针对项目复杂团队中的合作问题,本文构建了利他偏好条件下基于有限群体的间接演化博弈模型,分析了项目复杂团队中利他偏好和自私偏好的相互演化规律.研究表明:对于单位努力成本较高的项目,小规模团队、高利润分享,以及提高利他行为带来的精神收益,能够有效促进代理人向利他方向演化;相反,在单位努力成本较高的项目中,提高利润分享和利他行为的精神收益都不会促进代理人向利他方向演化,甚至会抑制团队中的利他合作行为.最后结合数值模拟对理论结论进行了验证,并为项目管理者促进复杂团队中的利他演化提供了策略建议.
Taking into consideration the cooperative problem in complex project teams, this paper establishes an indirect evolutionary game model incorporating with altruism preferences and finite groups, and studies the interaction and evolution of selfishness and altruism preferences in a complex project team. The results show that: for projects with higher unit effort costs, agents can be efficiently motivated towards altruism by smaller teams, higher profits shares, and other spiritual benefits from altruism ; in contrast, for projects with lower unit effort costs, higher profit share and spiritual benefits from altruism will not lead agents to be altruism or even potential altruism. Finally, the theoretical results are verified by a simulation and policy suggestions are made for managers aiming at promoting altruism in a complex project team.
出处
《管理科学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第11期35-46,共12页
Journal of Management Sciences in China
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71402191)
中国博士后科学基金面上资助项目(2014M550417)
关键词
项目复杂团队
利他偏好
合作行为
间接演化博弈
委托代理理论
complex project team
altruism preference
cooperative behavior
indirect evolutionary game
principal-agency theory