基于静态博弈模型的钓鱼岛争端分析

A Study on Sino-Japanese Dispute over Diaoyu Islands Based on Game Theory

运用博弈论方法,从成本和收益的角度研究钓鱼岛争端,建立了两个静态博弈模型。研究表明,中日在钓鱼岛问题上是否主动采取有效行动,与时间、形势、认知有关;中国强政府概率越大,日本对行动收益预估越小,越能阻止日本的行动,且应制定长远的、一致性与连贯性的政策,加强战略谋划等。

Based on game theory, this paper analyzes the dispute over Diaoyu Islands from the perspective of cost and profit and constructs a static game model with complete information and another model with incomplete information. On this basis, it reaches some conclusions： Whether China or Japan takes proactive actions on the Diaoyu Islands issue is in relation to time, situation and perception; the more powerful the Chinese government is, the less returns are expected of action on the Japanese side, thus better reducing the possibility of Japan＇s action. Besides, long-term and consistent polices should be made and strategic planning enhanced.