摘要
运用博弈论方法,从成本和收益的角度研究钓鱼岛争端,建立了两个静态博弈模型。研究表明,中日在钓鱼岛问题上是否主动采取有效行动,与时间、形势、认知有关;中国强政府概率越大,日本对行动收益预估越小,越能阻止日本的行动,且应制定长远的、一致性与连贯性的政策,加强战略谋划等。
Based on game theory, this paper analyzes the dispute over Diaoyu Islands from the perspective of cost and profit and constructs a static game model with complete information and another model with incomplete information. On this basis, it reaches some conclusions: Whether China or Japan takes proactive actions on the Diaoyu Islands issue is in relation to time, situation and perception; the more powerful the Chinese government is, the less returns are expected of action on the Japanese side, thus better reducing the possibility of Japan's action. Besides, long-term and consistent polices should be made and strategic planning enhanced.
出处
《东方论坛(青岛大学学报)》
2015年第5期121-126,共6页
Eastern Forum(JOURNAL OF QINGDAO UNIVERSITY)
基金
教育部人文社科青年基金项目"中日海上危机预警模型研究"(15YJCZH053)
国家社科基金重点项目"和平发展大战略下中国的海洋强国建设与海洋权益维护问题研究"(13AZZ013)之阶段性成果
关键词
钓鱼岛
搁置争议
静态博弈模型
收益
成本
Diaoyu Islands
shelving disputes
static game model
profit
cost