工具的悖论与工具的超越——试论黑格尔的认识论批判

The Antinomy of Instrument and Its Transcendence:On Epistemological Critique of Hegel

本文以黑格尔的工具隐喻为切入点,分析了其对近代认识理论的批判和超越。相对于知识本身而言,认识理论乃是对认识手段和认识过程的考察,因此是直接建立在认识工具的预设之上的。黑格尔指出了这个预设以及其中所包含的问题,即认识手段与认识对象的分离、认识过程与知识本身的分离,对传统的认识理论进行了彻底地分析和批判。黑格尔将康德哲学作为认识论悖论典型的发生场所,却在一定程度上忽略了康德的先验哲学与普通的工具论的差别,也忽略了康德在克服工具论的方向上所做出的努力。事实上,康德的先验逻辑这一特殊"工具"已经在一定程度上与传统工具论区别开来,其先验统觉所包含的统一性学说,为黑格尔通过绝对知识来最终克服认识论的内在悖论做了准备。

With Hegel’ s metaphor of instrument as an entry point, the present paper analyses its criticism and transcendence of modern epistemology. Related to the knowledge itself, epistemology is the investigation of cognitive means and cognitive process, and therefore it is directly based on the presupposition of cognitive instrument. Hegel pointed out this presupposition and the problems contained therein and separated cognitive means from cognitive object, and cognitive process from knowledge itself, which in fact has analyzed and criticized the traditional epistemology thoroughly. Hegel treated Kantian philosophy as a typical place where the epistemological antinomy occurs. However, to a certain extent, he ignored not only the difference between Kant’ s transcendental philosophy and general instrument theory but also the efforts to overcome instrument theory that Kant made. In fact, Kant’ s transcendental logic as a special“instrument” has been distinguished to some extent with the traditional instrument theory, and its transcendental apprehension, which contains totality theory, has made preparations for Hegel by means of absolute knowledge eventually to overcome the epistemological inherent antinomy.