消费者学习与政府补贴下的制造商-供应商合作研发

Manufacturer-supplier Cooperation in R&D with Consumer Learning and Government Subsidies

针对代际产品的研发合作,考虑消费者的学习因素,建立了消费者学习与政府补贴下的制造商-供应商合作研发博弈模型,研究双方的最优研发投入以及制造商分担供应商的最优研发投入比例,比较了是否考虑消费者学习时双方的研发投入水平,分析了政府的研发补贴策略,进行了数值仿真。研究表明,在上述两种均衡下,制造商和供应商最优研发投入均随消费者学习能力的增加而增加,随代际产品周期(消费者学习阶段)的增加而降低。消费者学习时的制造商和供应商最优研发投入水平均高于不考虑消费者学习的情形。政府对供应商的研发补贴与消费者的学习水平对促进制造商和供应商研发投入的作用是互补的。消费者的学习提升了政府补贴对制造商和供应商提升研发投入的强度。

To study R＆D cooperation of intergenerational products, the paper builds the manufacturer-supplier cooperative R＆D game model based on consumer learning and government subsidies to study the optimal R＆D expenditures of manufacturer-supplier and the optimal proportion of R＆D expenditures that the manufacturer shares with the supplier. This paper compares the R＆D expenditure levels of two firms based on consumer learning with those in the case without consumer learning, analyzes government R＆D subsidy policy with consumer learning, and carries out numerical simulation. The results indicate an increase in learning factor increases the R^D expenditures of the two firms, and an increase in learning stage decreases the R＆D expenditures in the two situations. Their R^D levels with consumer learning are higher than those in the case without consumer learning under the two equilibrium conditions. The impacts of government subsidies and consumer learning level on their R＆D expenditures are complementary. Government subsidies motivate the two firms to increase more R＆D？ expenditures due to the existence of consumer learning.