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CEO非正式权力、正式权力与企业绩效——来自中国民营上市公司的证据 被引量:30

CEO Informal Power,Formal Power and Firm Performance: Evidence from Chinese Listed Private Firms
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摘要 本文基于管理者权力理论与高阶梯队理论,以中国民营上市公司为研究对象,分别讨论了CEO非正式权力与正式权力以及正式权力与企业绩效之间的关系。研究结果显示:(1)CEO非正式权力,如CEO的年龄、CEO在其他单位兼职均与其正式权力显著正相关;(2)CEO正式权力与企业绩效呈倒"U"型的非线性关系,即随着CEO正式权力的提升,有利于企业绩效的增加。不过,当超过一定界限时,CEO正式权力的进一步增加会降低企业绩效。本文对CEO非正式权力与正式权力关系的考察,丰富了管理者权力理论在中国情境下的内涵;对正式权力与企业绩效关系的验证,为高阶梯队理论提供了更多的经验证据。此外,对以上两个问题的探讨,也为我国民营企业内部权力配置等公司治理问题提供了有益的启示。 Using the data of listed private firms,this paper investigates the relationship between the informal power and formal power of CEOs and their effects on the firm performance respectively. The empirical study shows:( 1) CEOs' informal power,such as the age of CEOs and CEO's serving in other board of directors,are positively and significantly related with their formal power;( 2) we obtain an inverted U shape curve between the CEOs' formal power and firm performance. That is to say,the firm performance goes up as the CEOs' formal power increases,but after CEOs' power reaches a certain point,the firm performance decreases if CEO's formal power increases continuously. This paper enriches the connotation of Managerial Power Theory under Chinese context by probing into the relationship between the CEOs' informal power and formal power,and the investigation of relationship between CEOs' power and firm performance also provide more evidences for the Upper Echelon Theory in different culture background. Furthermore,this paper sheds some lights into the firm governance and power allocation within Chinese private firms.
出处 《管理评论》 CSSCI 北大核心 2015年第11期161-169,共9页 Management Review
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(71402129) 教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(13YJC630226)
关键词 CEO 非正式权力 正式权力 民营企业 企业绩效 CEO informal power formal power private firms firm performance
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参考文献30

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