家族治理、银行监督与内部控制有效性

Study of Family Governance,Bank Supervision and Internal Control Effectiveness

大股东对小股东的利益侵占是家族企业主要的代理问题,家族控股股东为实现自己的掠夺会影响公司的内部控制质量。家族控制权比例越高,家族控股股东越有能力操控公司的内部控制质量满足自己的机会主义动机;对于外聘职业经理人的家族企业,家族仍实现了对企业的牢牢掌控,家族成员是否担任高管并不影响内部控制的有效性。短期借款对企业的约束提高了家族企业的内部控制质量。但在银行监管作用有限的条件下,银行借款并没有减少家族为获得控制权私利对内部控制质量的不利影响。

Interests conflicts between large and small shareholders are the main agency problems in family enterprises.Family controlling shareholders will affect the quality of company＇s internal control to achieve their own expropriation. The author finds that higher proportion of family control will lead to greater ability for the family controlling shareholders to manipulate the company＇s internal control quality to meet their own opportunistic motives. For family enterprises who employ external professional managers,family still control the company tightly;and whether the family members act as CEO did not affect the effectiveness of internal control. Short-term loans can constraint the enterprises and thus improve the quality of internal control. However,at this stage,the banks also have limited regulatory function,so bank loans did not reduce adverse effects of family control on the quality of internal control.