诠释学的科学哲学与诠释学的实在论(英文)

Hermeneutic Philosophy of Science and Hermeneutic Realism

本文将诠释学的科学哲学的原则与传统的哲学诠释学的原则放到一起。由此得出的结论是,后者的批判性议题的成立与否,取决于两个可疑的论断:科学探究令认知关系实体化,该实体化明确而又决定性地判定了科学对认识论上的客观主义的承诺。本文勾勒了拒斥这两个论断的方案。它反对如下假设,即科学探究由于缺乏资源来仔细审视展开探究过程中的认知关系的语境表述而备受困扰。在发展一种反对该假设的诠释学论证的过程中,本文讨论了一些与理解科学探究的反身性有关的问题。在此背景下,本文引入了在探究过程中与语境相关的诠释学情境概念。这种版本的诠释学的科学哲学在本文中成败攸关,它在有关实在论的争论中提出了一个立场,该立场有资格成为一种诠释学的实在论,这恰恰是那种与任何形式的笛卡尔主义的二元论、形而上学的本质主义与认识论的基础主义断然决裂的实在论。

This paper juxtaposes the tenets of hermeneutic philosophy of science with those of traditional philosophical hermeneutics. The conclusion is drawn that the latter＇s critical agenda stands and falls with the dubious claims that scientific inquiry hypostatizes the epistemic relationship, and that this hypostatization univocally and fatefully determines science＇s commitment to epistemological objectivism. The paper outlines a scenario for refuting both claims. It counters the assumption that scientific inquiry suffers from a lack of resources to scrutinize the contextual articulation of epistemic relationships within inquiry＇s unfolding. In developing hermeneutic arguments against this assumption, the paper addresses several issues concerning interpretive reflexivity of scientific inquiry. Against this background, the concept of contextually relevant hermeneutic situations in the process of inquiry is introduced. The version of hermeneutic philosophy of science which is at stake in the paper puts forward a position in the realism-debate. This position is qualified as hermeneutic realism. It is a kind of realism that breaks decisively with any form of Cartesian dualism, metaphysical essentialism, and epistemological foundationalism.