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中继行为的物理层安全博弈模型研究 被引量:2

The Physical Layer Security Features for Relay Behavior Using Dynamic Game
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摘要 无线网络中通过中继节点的协作可以提高网络中数据传输的物理层安全性.然而,中继节点的不可靠中继节点使物理层安全具有不确定性,基于不完全信息动态博弈,分析源节点与中继节点的博弈关系,建立不可靠中继节点行为博弈模型.根据中继节点当前行为与历史行为,并考虑误报与漏报,预测中继节点行为策略.提出基于信念的物理层安全传输机制,以保障源节点选择可靠中继节点.仿真结果表明,该机制能有效抑制中继节点的异常行为,从而保障物理层安全性. Unreliable relay in wireless network will lead to uncertainty of physical layer security. The conflict relationship between the source and the relay is investigated. The unreliable relay physical layer security game is established based on incomplete dynamic game theory. Meanwhile, current action, historical action, false negative and false positive in network are all considered to predicate relay behavior. A physical layer security transmission mechanism is proposed based on faith, which makes the source selects the reliable relay in the network. Simulation results show that this mechanism restrains the relay to select unreliable behavior effectively, as well as ensures physical layer security performance.
出处 《南开大学学报(自然科学版)》 CAS CSCD 北大核心 2015年第5期96-101,共6页 Acta Scientiarum Naturalium Universitatis Nankaiensis
基金 国家自然科学基金(61571323)
关键词 协作通信 物理层安全 中继行为 动态博弈 cooperative communication physical layer security relay behavior dynamic game
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