摘要
本文通过对目前已经实施股权激励方案上市公司的实证分析,研究股权激励机制的作用,得出企业经理人的持股比例与企业业绩不相关的结论。结论显示:我国上市公司股权激励机制与经营绩效之间不存在显著正相关关系。最后通过对我国国有上市公司的简单分析,从资本市场、职业经理人市场、公司治理方面的制约与缺陷提出建言。
Through empirical analysis of the listed companies which have implemented encouragement scheme of the stock option, this article studies the function of equity incentive mechanism, and comes to the conclusion that the shareholding ratio of the enterprise manager has nothing to do with the enterprise performance. The conclusion shows that there is no obvious positive correlation relationship between the equity incentive mechanism of listed company and operation performance. Finally, through simple analysis of the state-owned listed companies in China, suggestions are proposed from the restriction and deficiency of capital market, professional manager market and corporate governance.
出处
《价值工程》
2016年第1期31-34,共4页
Value Engineering
关键词
股权激励机制
经营绩效
企业经理人
equity incentive mechanism
operating performance
enterprise managers
