股权激励声誉效应研究

Research on Reputation of Stock-incentive

目前,国内外虽然有大量文献研究了股权激励,但多集中于动机方面,形成了二元固化思维,局限于股权激励福利动机、激励动机认识。前期,我们从声誉机制角度研究探讨了股权激励,发现了股权激励声誉效应可以产生声誉收益,这一发现使得一些净现值为负的股权激励成为可能,在此基础上首次提出了股权激励的声誉机制,并首次建立了理论框架。此次,笔者通过2007—2014年A股样本,发现股权激励存在声誉效应,股权激励带来的增量信息和增量声誉,能够获得资本市场信息中介的认可,显著吸引更多分析师的关注。这种声誉效应使得一些股权激励决策在净现值为负时仍存在实施的可能性,为股权激励决策声誉效应理论补充了关键证据。笔者这一重要理论创新适逢其时,在国企改革的今天具有特别重要的现实指导意义,本文也进一步提出了政策建议。

At present, although there are a large number literatures of Stock-incentive in domestic and foreign, but most of them have focused on the motivation, which forms the binary thinking and limits in Stock-incentive welfare motivation or incentive motivation. On our early research, we discuss the Stock-incentive on the perspective of reputation mechanism, and discover the reputation effect of the Stock-incentive that can generate reputation gains. This discovery make some of Stock-incentive whose NPV is negative to become possible, and firstly propose reputation mechanism of Stock-incentive, firstly establish a theoretical framework on this discovery. This time, by the sample of Chinese 2007 -2014 A shares＇, we find the existence of the reputation of the Stock-incentive effect. The Stock-incentive can bring incremental information and incremental reputation, which would obtain the recognition of information-intermediaries of capital market and would significantly attract more analysts＇ attention. This reputation effect makes some decisions of Stock-incentive whose NPV is negative still exist the implementation possibility. This can support key evidence for the theory of the Stock-incentive decision reputation. This discovery appear on a right time. Particularly, this is quiet important to today＇s Chinese state-owned enterprise reform, and then we suggest further policy recommendations.