中国企业集团关联交易:掏空支持还是相互保险

RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS IN CHINESE BUSINESS GROUPS:TUNNELING,PROPPING OR COINSURANCE

已有文献对于企业集团核心经济功能存在巨大争论,综合考虑掏空和支持互动机制有可能克服单一的掏空或支持视角研究的局限。本文实证考察了我国企业集团内部掏空和支持的时机选择、工具差异和经济后果,结果表明:当上市公司面临退市风险时,控股股东同时提供融资类和非融资类关联交易支持,而当控股股东陷入财务困境时,上市公司仅提供融资类关联交易支持,非对称存在的掏空支持互动机制构成集团内部成员间的相互保险。本文再利用证监会关联交易监管政策变动外生冲击开展的自然实验研究提供了补充证据,其政策含义在于监管当局应考虑制定关联交易的相机监管政策。

Existing literatures have arguments on business groups function for its facilitating the con- trolling shareholder tunneling or propping the listed companies. Considering the dynamic interactions of tunneling and propping may overcome the limitation of single perspective. This paper investigates the timing selection, tool difference and economic consequences of tunneling and propping interactions. The re- sults show that when listed companies facing delisted risk, controlling shareholder provides supports by both financing and non-financing RPTs. In turn, when controlling shareholder falls into financial crisis, only financing RPTs is provided by listed companies. The asymmetry interactions consist of coinsurance relationship among members of business groups, and the natural experiment based on RPTs regulatory policy change provides additional evidence. This finding has policy implications that regulators should make RPTs policies more flexible especially under crisis circumstance.