委托贷款对借贷关系和社会资金配置的影响——现实与理论的偏离

The Influence of Entrusted Loans to Loan Relationships and Social Capital Allocation——Deviation from Reality and Theory

近年来,我国商业银行的委托贷款规模不断扩大,对借贷关系和社会资金配置产生了明显影响。委托贷款作为商业银行的中间业务,拉长了委托人与借款人之间的委托代理关系,增加了社会资金的配置成本,降低了社会资源配置效率;委托人对借款人的监督比商业银行更有激励和效率;委托贷款对金融资源错配的纠偏作用可能会增加社会资源配置成本。所以,从宏观视角来看,委托贷款的司法设计并非经济学上的最优设计,如果商业银行从委托人与借款人之间的借贷关系中退出,通过市场化设计允许企业间的直接借贷,可能会提高整体社会福利。

Recent years, the size of the loan of the Commen.ial Bank of our country expands unceasingly, which brings significant impact on the allocation of credit and social capital. As the intermediary business of commercial banks, entrusted loans longed the principal-agent relationship between the principals and borrowers, increased the cost of social capital allocation and reduced the aUocation efficiency of social resources. The supervision on borrowers of principals are more incentive and effective than commercial banks. The corrective action of entrusted loans to financial resources＂ mismatch may increa~ the cost of social resource allocation. So, from a macro perspective, the judicial design of entrusted loans is not the optimal design in economics. If commercial banks exit from loan relationships between the principals and borrowers and then design the market rules to allow direct lending between enterprises, may improve the overall social welfare.