进化博弈视角下的政府间环境规制执行策略研究

Research on Implementation Strategy of Environmental Regulation between Local Governments under Perspective of Evolutionary Game

针对环境规制执行中地方政府之间的行为互动,从进化博弈论的研究视角探讨了地方政府的决策演化过程。通过建立地方政府之间的进化博弈模型,考察了环境规制执行中参与方的行为特征。通过复制动态机制发现了参与方的行为演化规律、分析了参与方的进化稳定策略及影响因素。研究表明:环境规制执行成本、排污费费率、环境指标在政绩考核体系中的权重、地方政府间的外部影响系数、严格执行环境规制对企业造成的利润损失、企业利润对地方政府支付水平的影响系数等因素,都会影响地方政府的进化稳定策略。

For the interaction between local governments in environmental regulation implementation, the evolutionary process of decision is discussed based on the evolutionary game theory. In this paper, an evolutionary game model between local governments is established to study the behavioral characteristics of participants in environmental regulation implemen- tation. Behavioral evolutionary law of participants is found out according to the replicator dynamics, evolutionarily stable strategy is analyzed, and the related influencing factors are also considered. The results show that the evolutionarily stable strategy of local government is affected by the cost of environmental regulation implementation, the rate of pollution dis- charge, the weight of environmental index in achievement assessment system, the coefficient of externality between local governments, the profit loss of enterprise from environmental regulation, and the influencing coefficient of profit on the pay- off of local government.