成本领先背景下公办养老机构与民办养老机构定价研究

Pricing Study on Public Pension Institution and Private Pension Institution Based on Cost Leadership

在充分考虑公办养老机构与民办养老机构存在成本差距的基础上,构建了公办养老机构与民办养老机构博弈模型,进而分析了成本差距及入住等待时间对两者竞争的影响,得到如下结论:(1)民办养老机构需求量及收益将随着两个养老机构成本差距扩大而减少,随着公办养老机构入住饱和度的增加而增加;公办养老机构需求量及收益呈相反方向变化。(2)相较于Nash博弈(纳什均衡博弈)情形,Stackelberg博弈(双寡头博弈)情形下的民办养老机构需求量将增加,而公办养老机构的需求量将减少;(3)Stackelberg博弈情形下两个养老机构的收益大于Nash博弈情形下两个养老机构的收益。

By taking consideration of cost gap of public pension institutions and private pension institutions, this paper establishes the game model of public pension institutions and private pension institutions, analyzes the impact of cost gap and check-in waiting time on the competition between public pension institutions and private institutions and obtains conclusions as follows： （1） with the cost gap increasing, the income and demand of the private pension institution will reduce, and with the saturation of public pension institution increasing, the income and demand of the private pension institution will increase, but for the public pension institution, the demand and income will get the change of the opposite direction; （2） compared with the Nash game, in the case of Stackelberg game, the demand of the private pension institution will increase, the demand of the public pension institution will reduce; （3） whether public or private pension institution, the income of Stackelberg game situation is bigger than the Nash game situation.