供应链金融应收账款融资模式下银企博弈分析

Game Analysis of Bank Accounts Receivable Financing Mode of Supply Chain Finance

融资难问题始终是制约中小企业发展的关键所在,供应链金融的出现,为解决中小企业的融资难问题提供了一条新途径。文章通过建立供应链金融应收账款融资模式下银企博弈模型,分析银行、核心企业和中小企业三者之间的相互关系,得出:在供应链金融应收账款融资模式中,核心企业的信用状况对中小企业的应收账款融资起着决定性的作用,当违约成本足够大时,核心企业与中小企业都会选择守约,从而实现三方共赢。

The financing difficulty is always the key to restricting the development of SMES. The appearance of supply chain fi-nance provides a new way to solve the problem of financing difficulties of SMES. In this paper, it analyzes the relationship between banks,core enterprise and SMES through establishing banking game model in the supply chain financial accounts receivable financing. It concludes that：in the supply chain finance accounts receivable financing mode, the credit conditions of the core enterprises play a decisive role in the accounts receivable financing of SMES. When the cost of default is large enough, the core enterprise and SMES will choose compliance to achieve tripartite win-win situation.