期刊文献+

国外劳动力市场政府管制研究述评

Review of Foreign Research on Labor Market Government Regulation
下载PDF
导出
摘要 国外劳动力市场政府管制在狭义上指的是就业保护管制,在广义上还包括政府对工会权利、集体谈判和社会保障方面的管制。效率理论、政权理论和法律起源理论从不同视角对各国劳动力市场政府管制的产生和多样性进行了解释。法规指标和调查指标的出现使劳动力市场政府管制严格程度的度量成为可能,也推动了关于管制影响方面经验性研究的发展。但在管制对就业、生产率等方面的影响研究中,研究结论尚不统一。国外研究的总体状况显示出实证性研究成为主旋律,基于国别背景的研究比跨国研究更为有效,如何创新管制方式以应对发展挑战成为当前研究的新方向。 Labor market regulation in foreign research refers to employment protection in the narrow sense, and in the broad sense it also includes government controls on trade union, collective bargaining and social security. Theory of efficiency, theory of political power and theory of legal origin explain the reasons of emergence and diversity of labor market regulation in the world from different perspectives. Different indicators based on legislative provisions or survey make it possible to mea-sure the stringency of labor market regulation and contribute to the development of empirical studies on the economic impacts brought by the regulation. But consistency in conclusions has not been reached in the influence of regulation on employment and productivity. It shows that empirical studies have become the main themes, the research based on the background of spe-cific country can draw more valid conclusions than transnational research, and the innovation of regulatory approach for coun-tries to deal with new challenges is becoming a new direction in research.
作者 王琼
出处 《湖北经济学院学报》 2015年第6期74-82,共9页 Journal of Hubei University of Economics
基金 湖北省教育厅人文社会科学研究项目(14G285)
关键词 政府 管制 劳动力市场 government regulation labor market
  • 相关文献

参考文献50

  • 1R. Block, K. Roberts. A Comparison of Labor Standards in the United States and Canada [J]. Industrial Relations, 2000, (2) : 273-306.
  • 2Timothy Besley, Robin Burgess. Can Labor Regulation Hinder Economic Performance? Evidence from India[R]. CEPR Discussion Papers,2002.3260.
  • 3Juan C. Botero, Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Flo- rencio Lopes-de-Silanes, Andei Shleifer. The Regulation of Labor [J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics,2004, (4) : 1339-1382.
  • 4Joseph E. Stiglitz. Markets, Market Failures, and Devel- opment [J].Ameriean Economic Review,1989, (2) :197- 204.
  • 5Edward Glaeser, Simon Johnson, Andrei Shleife. Coase versus the Coasians [J].Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2001, (3) :853-899.
  • 6Gary Becker, George Stigler. Law Enforcement, Malfea- sance, and the Compensation of Enforcers [J]. Journal of Legal Studies, 1974, (1) : 1-18.
  • 7Richard Posner. Economics Analysis of Law[M].Boston: Aspen Publishers, 1998.
  • 8Simon Johnson, John Mcmillan, Christopher Woodruff. Courts and Relational Contracts [J].Journal of Law and Economic Organtion, 2002, (1):221-77.
  • 9Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de- Silanes and Andrei Shleifer. Courts [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2003, (2) :453-517.
  • 10Edward Glaeser, Andrei Shleifer. The Rise of the Regulatory State [J].Journal of Economic Literature, 2003, (2) :401-425.

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部