不确定需求及WTP差异下废弃电子产品再制造闭环供应链奖惩机制研究

The Study of Premium and Penalty Mechanism of Waste Electronic Products for Closed-Loop Remanufacturing Supply Chain under Uncertain Demand and WTP Differentiation

考虑新产品和再制造品存在市场不确定需求和消费者支付意愿差异情况下,构建了废弃电子产品再制造闭环供应链的政府奖惩机制决策模型。证明了目标函数存在最优解,给出了求解的优化条件;通过数值仿真求解模型,分析了消费者对再制品的支付意愿以及政府奖惩机制对定价、回收率以及利润的影响。结果表明:政府实施制造商、零售商同时奖惩制度,比只奖惩其中之一效果更好;随着再制造品WTP值增大,再制造品的订购量逐渐替代新产品订购量,供应链整体利润也逐步增加;随着政府对制造商奖励力度的增加,制造商转移支付价格、废弃电子产品的回收率以及供应链整体利润都随之增加;随着政府对零售商奖惩力度的增加,废弃电子产品的回收率随制造商转移支付价格不断上升而增大,制造商的利润呈减少趋势,零售商的利润先减少后增加,拆解企业利润较前两项因素影响情况下最大。

Under uncertain demand and WTP differentiation,the article researches on the premium and penalty mechanism for closed-loop remanufacturing supply chain of waste electronic products.The objective function is proved and the optimum conditions for solving are given.The effects of WTP differentiation and premium and penalty mechanism on the price,return rate and profit are implemented by numerical simulation.The results show that it is better for government to implement premium and penalty mechanism on manufacturer and retailer rather than on only one of them.The remanufacturing products＇ order quantity will replace the new products＇ while the channel total profit will increase with the increasing of remanufacturing products＇ WTP.The payment to the removing corporate,return rate and the channel total profit will increase as the mechanism of rewarding manufacturer implementing.With the incentive intensity increasing,the return rate increases with the rising of the payment to removing corporation.Moreover,the manufacturer＇s profit decreases and the retailer＇s profit decreases first and then increases,but the profit of removing corporation is the highest compared with the pact of the other two factors.