地方政府干预与企业投资的同伴效应

Local Government Intervention and Peer Effect of Firm Investment

文章以我国上市公司1999-2012年的数据为样本,研究了我国企业当年新增投资是否会受到同地区不同行业企业平均新增投资的影响,并重点分析了地方政府干预是否会增强上述的企业投资同伴效应。研究发现,同地区不同行业企业间投资的同伴效应是存在的,即企业当年新增投资会随同地区不同行业企业平均新增投资的增加而增加;同时,在地方政府干预较强的地区,在省委书记离任前三年,在每个"五年计划"的最后两年,上述同伴效应更加显著。文章为地方政府干预影响所在地区企业投资的研究提供了新的证据。

Based on the data of listed companies in China from 1999 to 2012, this paper studies the issue about whether the new investment from a firm is highly sensitive to average new investments of firms which are located in the same area but belong to other in- dustries, and emphasizes whether local government intervention enforces the above-men-tioned peer effect of firm investment. The empirical results show that the peer effect of firm investment in different industries in the same region exists, namely the new invest- ment from a firm increases with the rise in average new investments of firms which are located in the same area but belong to other industries; at the same time, in areas with stronger local government intervention, in previous three years of departure of the provin- cial secretaries of CPC, and in the previous two years of the end of Five-Year Plans, the peer effect is more significant. This paper provides new evidence for the effect of local government intervention on firm investment.