关怀伦理视域下的社会正义可以接受吗?——对迈克尔·斯洛特关怀正义观的批判

Is Social Justice in the Vision of Care Ethics Acceptable?——A Critique to the Justice in Slote's Care Ethics

迈克尔·斯洛特从关怀德性伦理学推衍出一种社会"正义"观(即一种偏斜于"关怀"动机的法治程序型),认为国家的立法人员和司法人员只要从关怀的动机进行立法和执法活动,该社会就会是正义的。但该理论方案难以付诸现实。原因在于,偏斜的"关怀"动机会使立法、司法人员在立法和执法过程中优先考虑亲近利益,由此导致国家内部成员之间的不公平对待;在国际上,立法、司法人员会优先考虑本国利益,导致国家之间的不公平对待,使国际问题难达一致。只有从不偏斜的"仁慈"动机出发进行立法和司法活动,才能保证国家内部和国际之间的公平和正义。斯洛特的关怀——正义观,是为了调和当代西方女性关怀伦理学关于"关怀"与"正义"二元对立问题的争论,但其理论方案力度不够。

Based on his care virtue ethics, Michael Stoles deduces a perspective of social ＂ justice＂, one ＂ care＂-inclined motive legal procedural type, and argues that a society will be just as long as its state legislators and judiciaries duly carry out their duties under the motive of care. That theory is hardly applicable in practice, because under the motive of ＂ care＂ the said personnel tend to carry out their duties with preference to the close and intimate interests, hence leading to unfair treatment between members within a nation. In addition, nations in the international community may be also unfairly treated as the legislators and judiciaries will consider their own national interests first, hence impeding consensus on international issues. Only legislation and judiciary under the non-inclined motive of benevolence can guarantee fairness and justice within and between nations. Slote＇s care-based justice, a conciliation for the binary opposition between care and justice in contemporary feminist care-ethics, is not theoretically persuasive.