审计报告竞争行为研究

A Study on Audit Report Competition

目前,我国审计市场竞争激烈,注册会计师事务所之间不仅存在着价格竞争行为,还存在着审计报告竞争行为,对审计服务的质量产生了严重的负面影响,同时也损害了财务报告相关使用者的利益。通过构建管理当局与注册会计师的完全信息静态博弈模型,本文对审计报告竞争行为的主要影响因素进行探讨。研究发现:除了双方合谋所获收益的大小以外,注册会计师的业务能力及审计成本、对管理当局和注册会计师执业行为的监管力度以及目前的审计市场环境均对审计报告竞争行为具有一定的影响;博弈的混合策略纳什均衡结果表明,单一的措施并不能有效控制与防范审计报告竞争行为,因此上市公司与政府部门应双管齐下,全面治理,以有效降低管理当局与注册会计师违规操作的概率。

At present,the competition in Chinese audit market is fierce. Both price competition and audit report competition exist among Certified Public Accountant（ CPA） firms,which could lower the audit quality and harm the interests of financial reports＇ users. By setting up a static game model of perfect information,this paper explores the main influence factors of audit report competition. The results show that besides the benefits from complicity,CPAs＇ professional competence and audit cost,the supervision on both CPAs and managements,as well as the current audit market environment all have influence on audit report competition; the Nash equilibrium result of mixed strategy suggests that a single measure could not effectively control and discourage the audit report competition,so listed companies and the government should make joint efforts to fundamentally lower the probabilities of CPAs and managements＇ wrongdoings.