摘要
In the winter of 2010, the ＂Spring of the Arab Nations＂ suddenly erupted, leading to the collapse of the Arab old order and the fall of many Arab regimes that up until then were perceived as strong and solid. In many of the Arab states, the ＂Arab Spring＂, which began as a popular protest degenerated into a bloody civil war, and in the case of Syria it led in the summer of 2014 to the emergence onto the regional stage of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria （ISIS）. The earthquake in the Arab world was perceived by many Israelis as presenting a possible threat, not only to the regional stability and quiet that had reigned along lsrael＇s borders with its Arab neighbors, but also to the very existence of the peace agreements that had been a most important element in Israel＇s national security conception for four decades. In the face of this challenge, Israel chose a passive approach and to allow events to work themselves out and drag it along with them. In some of the arenas matters worked themselves out favorably, for example, in Egypt. In some of the arenas, like Syria and Lebanon, Israel remained a worried observer from the sidelines. In Syria chaos and Islamic extremism spread all over, and in Lebanon Hizballah continued to grow stronger. Meanwhile, the Palestinian arena with all its problems remained on ice, lingering in a state of waiting. Only time will tell whether Israel＇s policy was prudent or simply evasive. Was Israel behaving like the ostrich, burying its head in the sand and avoiding like fire any policy initiative？ Or was Israel＇s policy prudent, sound, and necessary given the limitations on Israel＇s power？
