期刊文献+

双层股权结构之评析——以阿里巴巴集团美国上市为例

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摘要 公司在其发展、扩大过程中需不断融资,但投资者越多,创始人的股权就被稀释,这就导致"一股一权"与"控制权"之间的矛盾。为避免这一矛盾可能造成的控制权旁落问题,一些公司采用"双层股权结构"。而这一股权结构的产生,引发了如代理成本、监督机制等问题。我国长期以来坚守"一股一权",未对双层股权结构给予肯定。笔者认为,我国应对双层股权结构辩证考量,宽容对待,有必要在现有的"同股同权"原则的基础上,充分发挥双层股权结构的优势,促进企业和资本市场的整体发展。
作者 何园媛
出处 《商场现代化》 2015年第28期130-131,共2页
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