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多选择效用不可转移对策核心的一个非空条件及公理化

A non-empty condition and an axiomatization for the core of multi-choice NTU games
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摘要 提出了π-均衡多选择效用不可转移对策(NTU对策)的概念,证明了π-均衡多选择NTU对策的核心非空,定义了多选择NTU对策的非水平性质和缩减对策,给出了相容性和逆相容性等概念.用个体合理性、单人合理性、相容性和逆相容性对非水平多选择NTU对策的核心进行了公理化. This paper introduces the concept of 1r-balanced multi-choice NTU games and proves that any π-balanced multi-choice NTU game has a non-empty core. The def- initions of non-leveled multi-choice NTU games and reduced games are introduced and the concepts of consistency and converse consistency are also given. An axiomatiza- tion for the core of non-leveled multi-choice NTU games is provided by using individual rationality, one-person rationality, consistency and converse consistency.
作者 田海燕 张刚
机构地区 西北工业大学应用数学系 河北师范大学数学与信息科学学院
出处 《运筹学学报》 CSCD 北大核心 2015年第4期97-106,共10页 Operations Research Transactions
基金 河北省自然科学基金(No.A2014205152)
关键词 多选择NTU对策 核心 π-均衡 相容性 multi-choice NTU games, cores, 7r-balancedness, consistency
分类号 O225 [理学—运筹学与控制论]
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运筹学学报
2015年 第4期

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