第二大股东对第一大股东的制衡路径分析——基于中国民营企业与国有企业的多案例研究

The Analysis of the Balance Path of the Second Largest Shareholder to the Largest Shareholder——Multiple Case Study of Private and State-Owned Enterprises in China

文章以中国后股权分置改革时期为背景,借鉴西方多个大股东的相关理论,运用多案例研究方法,通过选取两组五家具有多个大股东结构的上市公司(第一组:西藏药业和锦州港;第二组:ST景谷、天科股份和中百集团)进行案例内纵向研究、组内跨案例对比和组间跨案例对比研究,探讨第二大股东进行制衡的路径。研究发现:第二大股东主要采取引入关系股东、争取董事会席位的制衡路径;无论第二大股东采取何种制衡路径,第二大股东自身会获得一定好处,但并不能保证公司整体效率;国有企业的民营参股股东进行制衡总体上没有违反效率原则。

By the background of a equity division reform in China as the background and based on the theory of multiple large shareholders in the West and the method of multiple cases study, the paper selects five listed enterprises （ the first group ： Tibet Rhodiola Pharmaceutical Holding Co. , Ltd, Jinzhou Port Co. , Ltd; the second group： Yunnan Jinggu Forestry Co. , Ltd, Sichuan Tianyi Science ＆ Technology Co. , Ltd, Zhongbai Holdings Group Co. , Ltd） of two groups with multiple large shareholders and ex- plores the balancing path of the second largest shareholders through study of longitudinal study in the cases, comparative study within the group and comparative study of cross-cases between groups. The results show that ： the second largest shareholder can balance the largest shareholder by introducing associated shareholders, striving for board seats after the equity division reform ; regardless of the path taken by the second-largest shareholder, the second-largest shareholders themselves will receive certain benefits, but it can- not guarantee the enterprises＇ overall efficiency ; and the balancing of privately operated second-largest shareholders of the state- owned enterprises in the competition has no violation of the principle of efficiency.