融资约束、代理成本对企业R＆D投资的影响--基于我国上市公司的经验证据

The Impact of Financing Constraints and Agency Costs on the Corporate R&D Investment in China

本文以2009-2012年中国上市公司年报数据为研究样本,基于欧拉方程投资模型,采用Kumbhakar and Parmeter(2009)提出的双边随机边界法实证检验融资约束和代理成本对企业R&D投资的影响。结果发现:融资约束与R&D投资显著负相关,代理成本与R&D投资显著正相关。即融资约束导致R&D投资不足,代理成本导致R&D投资过度。进一步分析发现:融资约束使上市公司R&D投资的绝对值(相对值)整体上较最优水平低42.41%(43.27%),代理成本使上市公司R&D投资的绝对值(相对值)整体上较最优水平高22.48%(21.73%),二者抵消后最终表现为净低于最优水平的19.93%(21.54%)。这种差异在不同地区、行业、公司性质及年度里略有不同。由此可见,我国上市公司尚未陷入R&D投资的"加速化陷阱",仍有必要加大R&D投资。论文最后针对研究中发现的问题提出了相应的对策和建议。

With reference to the Euler-equation investment model,this paper draws on the financial information disclosed in the Annual Reports of China's listed companies from 2009 to 2012 and examines the impact of financing constraints and agency costs on the corporate R&D investment by using two-tier stochastic frontier model proposed by Kumbhakar et al(2009).The results show that there is a significantly negative association between financing constraint and R&D investment and a significantly positive association between agency cost and R&D investment.This means that financing constraint tends to induce R&D under-invested and agency cost tends to make R&D over-invested.Further analysis shows that financing constraint induces the absolute value(relative value)of R&D investment to be less than the optimal level by 42.41%(43.27%)and that agency cost makes the absolute value(relative value)exceed the optimal level by 22.48%(21.73%).As a result,financing constraint and agency cost jointly make R&D investment to be less than the optimal level by 19.93%(21.54%)which varies slightly with regions,industries,properties of the company and years.Therefore,China's enterprises have not fallen into the'acceleration trap'of R&D investment,and it is still necessary to increase R&D investment.Finally,we propose some suggestions and measures to deal with the problems found in this study.