现金股利迎合、再融资需求与企业投资——投资效率视角下的半强制分红政策有效性研究

Catering Cash Dividend Decision,Refinancing Needs and Corporate Investment——Policy Effectiveness of Semi-mandatory Cash Dividend under Investment Efficiency Perspective

评价半强制分红政策保护投资者利益目标是否实现,不能仅仅着眼于现金分红水平是否提高,更要关注上市公司现金分红能力和资本投资效率是否改善。本文基于我国上市公司数据,对半强制分红政策下的现金股利决策对公司投资效率和融资约束的影响进行分类研究。研究发现:对于有再融资需求公司,不仅迎合现金分红会提高公司的投资-现金流敏感性,而且过度现金分红会加大公司再融资需求与投资不足的敏感性;对于无再融资需求公司,迎合现金分红不会增加公司的投资-现金流敏感性,但门槛现金分红也不能降低公司自由现金流与投资过度的敏感性。这给优化半强制分红政策、完善股利决策自治机制提供现实启示和实证依据。

To evaluate the effectiveness of semi-mandatory dividend policy to protect the interests of investors,we could not just focus on the level of cash dividends,but also the improvement of cash dividends ability and investment efficiency of listed companies.Based on the data of China's listed companies,the empirical findings are:for the companies which have refinancing needs,catering of semi-mandatory cash dividend policy aggravates the situation of financing constraints,moreover,Excessive cash dividend decision increases the sensitivity of refinancing demand and under-investment;While for the companies which have no refinancing needs,catering of semi-mandatory cash dividend policy doesn't aggravate the financing constraints,but the threshold of cash dividend decision cannot reduce the sensitivity of the free cash flow and over-investment.