政治关系与房地产企业拖欠土地增值税行为

Political Connection and the Behavior of Owing Land Increment Tax in Estate Enterprises

当前土地增值税按超率累增税率30%-60%征收,对于房地产企业是非常大的开发成本,企业存在强烈的动机规避这项支出。而土地增值税属于地方税种,政府是企业在税收活动中的最大利益相关者,房企建立良好的政治关系能够帮助企业得到拖欠税额的制度外优惠。通过建立企业欠税模型,以128家上市房地产企业为例,实证研究政治关系与土地增值税欠税行为。研究发现上市房地产企业中有政治关系的约占60%,这些房地产企业要比无政治关系的房企每年多拖欠4000万以上的税额。拖欠严重的原因一方面在于房企主观上拖欠动机强烈,另一方面地方政府希望通过默许拖欠行为给予企业制度外税收优惠,从而实现其税收竞争的目的。

Current land increment tax is one kind of progressive tax in excess of specific rate ranged from30% to 60%. As for real estate enterprises,land increment tax accounts for a very large amount in operating cost,therefore real estate enterprises have a strong intrinsic motivation to avoid this expenditure. In another aspect,land increment tax belongs to local tax,and local government is the closest stakeholder in tax payment activity of real estate enterprises. Then real estate enterprises can help themselves achieve the privilege of owing land increment tax with their political connection. The article selects 128 listed companies during the period of 2008- 2012 as example to analyze how real estate enterprise＇s political connection influences the behavior of owing land increment tax in empirical evidence. The result shows that 60% of the listed Real Estate Enterprises have already built up political connection,and indeed those connected companies have 40 million more owing tax than those unconnected every year. This phenomenon is not only drove by real estate enterprises＇ subject owing motivation,and also stimulated by the tax competition behavior between local governments,that is giving companies tax owing privilege outside the system. Then local government can realize purpose of tax competition.