法律诉讼与公司财务政策被引量：9

Lawsuits and Corporate Financial Policies

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摘要本文研究了法律诉讼能否通过影响市场资源配置和管理者行为，对公司财务政策产生影响，从而发挥公司外部治理功能。本文整理了2000～2013年我国上市公司资金类法律诉讼事件，运用面板数据模型和双重差分（DID）方法检验了法律诉讼对被告公司财务政策的影响。结果发现：一、法律诉讼使被告公司的投资和融资规模显著降低；二、法律诉讼对规模较小和信息不对称程度较高的公司财务政策影响更大；三、遭受法律诉讼后，外部融资依赖较强的公司总融资所受影响更大，但投资所受影响与外部融资依赖较弱的公司相比无明显差异。结果揭示了法律诉讼能够发挥外部治理功能，有效监督上市公司的财务行为。 This paper studies whether lawsuits can act as an extemal governance mechanism by allocation mechanism and restricting management behavior. Collecting lawsuits in Chinese market from 2000-2013 by hand, this paper uses panel model and DID approach to investigate the impact of lawsuits on corporate financial policies, the results show that firms those have been sued decrease investment and financing significantly. Moreover, our results are stronger for smaller firms and firms with higher information asymmetry, lawsuits have a stronger effect on financing for firms which have stronger dependence of external finance, but the difference of the effect of lawsuits on corporate investment conditional on the dependence of external finance is much smaller. The results reveal that lawsuits can act as an external governance mechanism and supervise coroorate financial behavior effectively.

作者俞国栋周开国郑倩昀

机构地区中山大学岭南学院

出处《证券市场导报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2015年第12期27-35,共9页 Securities Market Herald

基金国家自然科学基金项目(71572203 71172161) 教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目(14JZD007) 教育部人文社科重点研究基地中山大学港澳珠三角研究中心的资助广东省人文社会科学研究重大攻关项目(11ZGXM79001) 港澳与内地合作发展协同创新中心

关键词法律诉讼财务政策信息不对称外部融资依赖 lawsuits, financial policies, information asymmetry, external financing dependence

分类号 F275 [经济管理—企业管理] D922.29 [政治法律—经济法学]

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