国有控股公司管理层报酬的政策干预效果评估——基于“限薪令”和“八项规定”政策干预的拟自然实验

The Effectiveness of Intervention Policy on Managerial Compensation by Simulated Tests of Relevant Administrative Orders

本文基于2009年"限薪令"和2012年"八项规定"政策干预的拟自然实验,借助平衡面板数据政策干预效果的评估方法,建立政策干预发生前后的一阶差分模型。以此为基础,本文利用国有控股上市公司的平衡面板数据对"限薪令"和"八项规定"的干预效果进行实证检验。结果表明,"八项规定"有效地遏制了管理层货币薪酬或在职消费增加,而"限薪令"却没有类似的作用效果。结果也表明,无论是"八项规定",还是"限薪令",均未能对管理层货币薪酬或在职消费的降低起到积极的作用。

By building an first-differenced equation based on two-stage balanced panel data between 2008-2013 in Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares stock market, this paper explores the effect of intervention policy on the compensation of top management in SOEs. We find that, the ＂Eight rules＂ policy has a positive role, that is, ＂eight rules＂ limits the further increase of managerial salary and professional consumption, while the ＂salary limitation＂ policy does not have a similar role. We also find that intervention policies do not have an positive role on promoting the decline of managerial comoensation.