摘要
鉴于我国种业发展存在创新水平低、"套牌"和假冒伪劣产品充斥市场等问题,利用演化博弈理论的方法,对我国种业创新企业的创新行为进行演化博弈分析,并对我国种业创新困境进行解释,主要结论如下,知识产权保护制度不完善导致"柠檬市场";种业市场虚假繁荣下面临技术扩散约束;低市场集中度约束了模仿企业创新投入和市场定价能力;消费者偏好保守不利于种业企业创新的增加;企业的短见对种业创新产生约束。
As China's seed industry is under low level innovation,and counterfeit products are prevailing,this paper analyzed the firms' innovation behaviors and used Evolutionary Game Theory to predict the factors influencing companies group innovation behavior so as to analyze the innovation dilemma. The conclusions are as follows: firstly,imperfect intellectual property protection system leads to "Lemon Market"; secondly,technology diffusion is constrained under false prosperity market; thirdly,low market concentration constrains the imitative innovation companies' RD investment and pricing ability; fourthly,consumers ' risk avoidance preference negatively influences the companies ' innovation; finally,shortsighted companies constrain the industry innovation.
出处
《科技管理研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第24期158-164,共7页
Science and Technology Management Research
关键词
原始创新
模仿
演化博弈
种业
original innovation
imitate
evolutionary gaming
seed industry