完全信息下的合同能源管理节能效益分享模式博弈模型

A Game for the Shared Saving Model of Energy Performance Contract under Perfect Information

应用序贯博弈理论,建立完全信息下的节能效益分享模式合作博弈模型,从理论上分析用户和节能服务公司的最优决策行为及项目特点和成本结构对决策行为的影响。研究发现,最优的绩效水平和节能效益分享比例由项目特征和成本结构决定;低能耗或低能源价格的用户选择较高的节能效益分享比例,而高能耗或高能源价格的客户选择较低的节能效益分享比例;节能服务公司根据项目基准能耗及用户给予的节能效益分享比例进行绩效水平选择,对于基准能耗较高的客户,即使节能效益分享比例较低,也会选择较高的绩效水平;若提升绩效水平的成本增加大于其增长带来的收益,节能服务公司和用户在项目决策会选择较低的分享比例和较低的绩效水平。

This paper applies sequential game theory to construct the game model of the shared savings model under complete information,then analyzes both user and Energy Service Companies（ ESCOs） ＇ decision behavior,and the project＇s characteristics and cost structure＇s impact on those decision behavior. Results show that the optimized performance level and energy- saving benefit sharing ratio are decided by the project＇s characteristics and cost structure; those users with lower energy consumption or lower energy price users will choose higher sharing ratio,meanwhile those users with high energy consumption and high energy price will prefer a higher sharing ratio. According to the project＇s energy consumption baseline and sharing ratio,ESCOs choose the performance level. Even if the sharing ratio is low,ESCOs prefer a higher performance level with higher energy consumption baseline. If the increasing cost is more than the increasing benefits when performance level is increasing,ESCOs and users will choose a lower sharing ratio and lower performance level.