银行高管薪酬具有风险敏感性吗?——来自中国上市银行的经验证据

Does Bank Executive Compensation Have Risk Sensitivity? From the Empirical Evidence of China's A-share Listed Banks

基于我国经济转型期的特殊背景,运用2001—2012年间我国上市银行的数据,从银行风险承担角度检验了银行高管薪酬是否具有风险敏感性。研究结果表明,高管薪酬与风险承担间具有显著负相关关系,即风险承担对银行高管薪酬具有约束作用,也意味着我国上市银行的高管薪酬具有风险敏感性。进一步研究显示:董事会会议次数和独立董事规模未能对高管薪酬风险敏感性产生显著性影响,而董事会规模与风险承担对高管薪酬的约束表现出显著的相互替代关系,但这种替代关系仅体现在非国有控股银行中;另外,相对于非国有控股银行,高管薪酬风险敏感性在国有控股银行中显得更加显著,表明国有控股银行更加注重银行经营风险的控制。

Based on the special background of China’s economic transition, the study examines whether executive compensa-tion has a risk sensitivity or not from the perspective of banks risk-taking by using 2001-2012 data from Chinese listed banks. The results show that, executive compensation has a significant negative correlation with risk-taking. It also means that execu-tive compensation of Chinese listed banks have a risk sensitivity. The further research shows independent directors and board meetings have no significant correlations with a risk sensitivity of executive compensation, and a board size and risk-taking on executive compensation shows the alternative relationship between each other, but the alternative relationship mainly exists in non-state-controlled banks. At the same time, with respect to the non-state-controlled banks, risk sensitivity of executive com-pensation appears stronger in state-controlled banks, and it shows that state-controlled banks always pay more attention on risk-controlling.