摘要
以阿里巴巴蚂蚁金服旗下的芝麻信用作为案例,比较分析当前第三方和传统银行个人征信的现状和特点,认识到互联网金融企业与银行间的个人征信信息共享是一种囚徒困境。构建博弈支付模型,分析互联网金融企业与银行在个人征信信息共享过程中的决策行为,提出可通过使用显性合同改变原有博弈结构,创建激励和监督机制使信息共享,走出囚徒困境,从而实现帕累托最优均衡。
With the case of the Sesame credit in Alibaba Ant, a comparative analysis is made on the status quo and characteristics of the third party and the traditional bank personal credit information ; it＇ s known that personal credit information sharing between Internet financial enterprises and banks is prisoners＇ dilemma. This paper constructs a game payment model, analyzes the decision-making behavior during the information sharing process for Internet financial enterprises and banks, and believes that they can go out of prisoners＇ dilemma and realize the Pareto optimal equilibrium by changing the original game structure with the usage of explicit contracts, and by creating the incentive and supervision mechanism for information sharing.
出处
《征信》
2015年第11期13-17,共5页
Credit Reference
关键词
个人征信
信息共享
互联网金融企业
银行
博弈支付模型
personal credit reporting
information sharing
Internet financial enterprises
banks
gamepayment model
