集体经营性建设用地入市与地方政府和村集体的博弈

The Marketilization of Commercial Collective Construction Land and the Game between Local Government and Village Collectives

集体经营性建设用地入市流转必触动既得利益者,特别是地方政府和村集体。通过构建完全信息动态博弈模型,运用逆向归纳法分析两者在上市中可能的决策倾向,有利于解释现存制度不足。研究表明,在现存税收、土地制度下,集体经营性建设用地入市会受到地方政府阻碍;要达到政策预期改革效应,须改革税费,提高征地成本,同时修订和补充现行物权法、土地管理法、税法和城市房地产管理法中涉及流转及利益分配原则和程序的条款,建立初次流转增值归公和城乡一体土地税制,为集体经营性建设用地入市提供制度保障,实现和规范博弈利益的分配。

The marketilization of commercial collective construction land will affect the vested interests, especially the local government and village collective organizations. It helps to explain the deficiency of current system by building a complete information dynamic game theory model, and using backward in- duction to analyses the possible decision between the two in the market. The research indicates that in the present tax and land system, the marketilization of commercial collective construction land will be blocked by the local government; to achieve the expected policy reform effect, we must implement tax re- form, raise the cost to expropriate land, and revise the provisions involving in procedures of circulation and profit distribution in Property Law, Land Management Law, Tax Law and City Real Estate Manage- ment Law to regulate and guide the behavior of the main benefits ; and establish the land increment in ini- tial transfer belongs to the public, and set up the urban and rural land tax system to provide institutional guarantee to regulate the direct marketilization of commercial collective construction land and the distribu- tion of game benefits.