摘要
为提高政府食品安全监管绩效,维护食品企业品牌声誉,建立优化模型分别分析零售商主导与零供一体化模式中的政府部门食品安全监管水平与零售商质量安全检验精确度的联动机制及其影响因素。主要结论表明:供应商对质量安全问题的赔偿额度过低或者过高会导致零售商质量安全检验不作为或者检验过度以及政府监管不利或者监管过度的后果;只有零售商的品牌声誉价值相对较高时,其在零供一体化模式中的质量安全检验精确度才更高。
In order to improve the performance of government supervision and maintain the brand reputa- tion of food firms, the interaction mechanism between government supervision and retailers' inspection on food safety and its influential factors in the mode of the retailer as the leader and the mode of the retailers and the suppliers as the whole are analyzed by the optimal models. The results show that if the amount of compensation paid by the suppliers for the problems of quality and safety is too high or too low, will lead to result of supervision omission or excess of suprvision by the retailers and/or the government; only when retailers' brand reputation is comparatively high, in the retailer and the supplier as the whole mode. inspection accuracy of quality and safety is high
出处
《华南农业大学学报(社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第1期92-98,共7页
Journal of South China Agricultural University(Social Science Edition)
基金
国家社会科学基金项目(14CGL040)
教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(13YJC630029)
中国博士后科学基金项目(2013M530925)
大连市社科联重点课题(dlskzd2014026)
关键词
食品安全
政府监管
食品企业
零售商
品牌声誉
赔偿额度
food safety
government supervision
food finns
retailer
brand reputation
the amount ofcompensation