食品安全的政府监管与零售商检验的联动机制

Interaction Mechanism between Government Supervision and Retailers' Inspection on Food Safety

为提高政府食品安全监管绩效,维护食品企业品牌声誉,建立优化模型分别分析零售商主导与零供一体化模式中的政府部门食品安全监管水平与零售商质量安全检验精确度的联动机制及其影响因素。主要结论表明:供应商对质量安全问题的赔偿额度过低或者过高会导致零售商质量安全检验不作为或者检验过度以及政府监管不利或者监管过度的后果;只有零售商的品牌声誉价值相对较高时,其在零供一体化模式中的质量安全检验精确度才更高。

In order to improve the performance of government supervision and maintain the brand reputa- tion of food firms, the interaction mechanism between government supervision and retailers＇ inspection on food safety and its influential factors in the mode of the retailer as the leader and the mode of the retailers and the suppliers as the whole are analyzed by the optimal models. The results show that if the amount of compensation paid by the suppliers for the problems of quality and safety is too high or too low, will lead to result of supervision omission or excess of suprvision by the retailers and/or the government; only when retailers＇ brand reputation is comparatively high, in the retailer and the supplier as the whole mode. inspection accuracy of quality and safety is high