摘要
对中国基层政府而言,政治性执行的政策是博弈空间最小的政策。然而,这并不意味着基层政府完全处于被动执行的状态。基层政府可以通过精心设计的利益表达途径,寻求对上级政府的说服,从而软化政策的紧张程度,实现自身利益最大化。职业生涯的考虑和双向责任的存在是基层领导进行利益表达的主要原因。同时,政治性执行的政策客观上也存在软化的空间,这是由制度规范、政策特征和行政文化所决定的。基层政府通过利益表达而软化政策,这表明在纵向政府间关系中,存在着一种参与式的决策过程,在这一过程中,基层政府事实上分享了上级政府的部分政策制定权力。
For grassroots government,the game space of political implementing policy is the smallest,but it doesn't mean that the grassroots government passively implements this kind of policy. The grassroots government can persuade the higher government by carefully designed interest articulation methods,so as to release the tension and maximize its interest. The reasons for grassroots leaders' interest articulation are their career and the existence of bidirectional duty.At the same time,there is the space to soften political implementing policies,which is determined by the institutional norms,policy features and administrative culture.The grassroots government can soften policies by interest articulation,which indicates that there is a participatory decision process in the vertical relations of governments,and that the grassroots government shares some policymaking power by the process.
出处
《武汉大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第6期40-47,共8页
Wuhan University Journal:Philosophy & Social Science
基金
国家社会科学基金青年项目(09CZZ035)
关键词
中国基层政府
政治性执行
利益表达
间接谈判
grassroots government
political implementation
interest articulation
indirect bargaining