关税和补贴对国企国有股份最优占比的影响——基于混合寡占理论分析

Tariff and Subsidy's Effects on SOE's Optimal State-Owned Stock Ratio:An Analysis Based on Mixed Oligopoly Theory

建立一个两阶段混合寡占博弈模型,结合战略贸易理论考察在开放经济环境里,国企在背负一定的社会性负担的条件下,国企股份制改革过程中我国生产性补贴和进口关税两项政策对国企最优国有控股占比的影响.研究发现,在所有前提条件相同的情况下,国企有国家信用做保障,更具有竞争力.而在生产性补贴和进口关税政策下,国企最优国有控股占比都随着补贴和关税增加而增加,随补贴和关税的减少而减少.

This paper built a two stage mixed oligopoly model to study how tariff and subsidy affect state-owned enterprises＇ optimal state-owned stock ratio within open economy environment,when state-owned enterprises bear some social burden.Our basic results are as follows：when the other conditions are the same,state-owned enterprises have stronger competitiveness due to the state credit guarantee.While considering productive subsidy or import tariff policy,the optimal state-owned stock ratio would decrease with the productive subsidy or import tariff coming down.